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999 F.2d 699
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Jennifer LOPER, William Kaye, on
behalf of themselves, and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
The NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Lee P. Brown, Commissioner of NYC
Police Dept., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 1035, Docket 92-9127.  | Argued
May 12, 1993.  | Decided July 29, 1993.
Individuals who begged on city streets brought action against
city police department seeking to enjoin enforcement of
New York statute prohibiting loitering in public places for
purposes of begging. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Robert W. Sweet, J., 802
F.Supp. 1029, entered summary judgment for individuals, and
department appealed. The Court of Appeals, Miner, Circuit
Judge, held that statute violated First Amendment.
Affirmed.
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*701  Before: MINER, McLAUGHLIN and FRIEDMAN, *
Circuit Judges.
* The Honorable Daniel M. Friedman, of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by
designation.
Roffer, Michael 8/5/2015
For Educational Use Only
Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 999 F.2d 699 (1993)
62 USLW 2067
 © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
Opinion
MINER, Circuit Judge:
Defendants-appellants The New York City Police
Department and Lee F. Brown, Commissioner of the
Department, (“City Police”) appeal from a summary
judgment entered in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York (Sweet, J.) in favor
of plaintiffs-appellees Jennifer Loper and William Kaye,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
(“Plaintiffs”). The district court in this case has certified a
plaintiff class consisting of all “needy persons who live in
the State of New York, who beg on the public streets or in
the public parks of New York City.” Loper v. New York City
Police Dep't, 802 F.Supp. 1029, 1033 (S.D.N.Y.1992). The
court defined a “needy person” as “someone who, because of
poverty, is unable to pay for the necessities of life, such as
food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and transportation.” Id.
The judgment declared unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds the following provision of the New York Penal Law
and enjoined the City Police from enforcing it:
A person is guilty of loitering when he:
1. Loiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for
the purpose of begging....
N.Y. Penal Law § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1989).
On appeal, the City Police argue that begging has no
expressive element protected by the First Amendment,
that even if a speech interest is implicated in Plaintiffs'
conduct, the government's interest in the maintenance of order
outweighs the Plaintiffs' interest, and that, in any event, the
message Plaintiffs seek to convey is entitled only to the
“minimal protection” afforded by the “outer perimeters of the
First Amendment.”
The City Police regard the challenged statute as an essential
tool to address the evils associated with begging on the
streets of New York City. They assert that beggars tend to
congregate in certain areas and become more aggressive as
they do so. Residents are intimidated and local businesses
suffer accordingly. Panhandlers are said to station themselves
in front of banks, bus stops, automated teller machines and
parking lots and frequently engage in conduct described as
“intimidating” and “coercive.” Panhandlers have been known
to block the sidewalk, follow people down the street and
threaten those who do not give them money. It is said that
they often make false and fraudulent representations to induce
passers-by to part with their money. The City Police have
begun to focus more attention on order maintenance activities
in a program known as “community policing.” They contend
that it is vital to the program to have the statute available for
the officers on the “beat” to deal with those who threaten and
harass the citizenry through begging.
Although it is conceded that very few arrests are made
and very few summonses are issued for begging alone,
officers do make frequent use of the statute as authority
to order beggars to “move on.” The City Police advance
the theory that panhandlers, unless stopped, tend to increase
their aggressiveness and ultimately commit more serious
crimes. According to this theory, what starts out as peaceful
begging inevitably leads to the ruination of a neighborhood.
It appears from the contentions of the City Police that only
the challenged statute stands between safe streets and rampant
crime in the city.
It is ludicrous, of course, to say that a statute that prohibits
only loitering for the purpose of begging provides the only
authority that is available to prevent and punish all the socially
undesirable conduct incident to begging described by the City
Police. There are, in fact, a number of New York statutes that
proscribe conduct of the type that may accompany individual
solicitations for money in the city streets. For example, the
crime of harassment in the first degree is committed by
one who follows another person in or about a public place
or places or repeatedly *702  commits acts that place the
other person in reasonable fear of physical injury. N.Y. Penal
Law § 240.25 (McKinney Supp.1993). If a panhandler, with
intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm,
uses obscene or abusive language or obstructs pedestrian or
vehicular traffic, he or she is guilty of disorderly conduct.
N.Y. Penal Law §§ 240.20(3), (5) (McKinney 1989). A
beggar who accosts a person in a public place with intent to
defraud that person of money is guilty of fraudulent accosting.
Id. § 165.30(1). The crime of menacing in the third degree
is committed by a panhandler who, by physical menace,
intentionally places or attempts to place another person in
fear of physical injury. N.Y. Penal Law § 120.15 (McKinney
Supp.1993).
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The distinction between the statutes referred to in the
preceding paragraph and the challenged statute is that the
former prohibit conduct and the latter prohibits speech as
well as conduct of a communicative nature. Whether the
challenged statute is consonant with the First Amendment is
the subject of our inquiry. We do not write upon a clean slate
as regards this inquiry, since the Supreme Court as well as this
Court has addressed restrictions on the solicitation of money
in public places.
In Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903 F.2d 146
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984, 111 S.Ct. 516, 112
L.Ed.2d 528 (1990), there was at issue before us a regulation
prohibiting begging and panhandling in the New York City
Subway System. In that case we “wonder[ed]” whether the
beggars' “conduct is not divested of any expressive element as
a result of the special surrounding circumstances involved in”
begging in the subway, but we did not rest our decision “on
an ontological distinction between speech and conduct.” Id. at
154. We did find that the conduct element of begging, in the
confined atmosphere of the subway, “ ‘disrupts' and ‘startles'
passengers, thus creating the potential for a serious accident
in the fast-moving and crowded subway environment.” Id. at
158. This finding led to our conclusion that the New York
City Transit Authority's “judgment that begging is alarmingly
harmful conduct that simply cannot be accommodated in the
subway system is not unreasonable.” Id.
In our First Amendment analysis in Young, we applied
the “more lenient level of judicial scrutiny,” id. at 157,
prescribed in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88
S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (conviction for destruction
of draft card in anti-war protest allowed to stand where
speech and nonspeech elements combined in same course of
conduct). In accordance with the test outlined in O'Brien,
we determined: 1) that the subway regulation was within the
constitutional power of government; 2) that the regulation
advanced substantial and important governmental interests;
3) that the governmental interests were not related to the
suppression of free expression; and 4) that, because “the
exigencies created by begging and panhandling in the subway
warrant the conduct's complete prohibition,” Young, 903
F.2d at 159, the First Amendment freedom restrictions were
no greater than were essential to further the government's
interest. Id. at 157-59. Citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 802, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2759-60, 105 L.Ed.2d
661 (1989), we observed that ample alternative channels of
communication were open. Most pertinent to our analysis in
the case at bar, we stated:
Under the regulation, begging is
prohibited only in the subway, not
throughout all of New York City. It
is untenable to suggest, as do the
plaintiffs, that absent the opportunity
to beg and panhandle in the subway
system, they are left with no means
to communicate to the public about
needy persons.
Young, 903 F.2d at 160. The case before us does prohibit
begging throughout the City and does leave individual
beggars without the means to communicate their individual
wants and needs.
We also decided in Young that the district court erred in
concluding that the subway is a public forum where begging
and panhandling must be allowed. We indicated that the
subway is at best a limited forum that could be, and was,
properly restricted as to the types of speech and speakers
permitted:
[T]here can be no doubt that the
[New York City Transit Authority]
intended to *703  continue its long-
standing prohibition of begging and
panhandling even after revising the
regulation to permit solicitation by
organizations.
Id. at 161. The special conditions of the subway system were
said to require a limitation on expressive activity, and we
referred in Young to our earlier holding in Gannett Satellite
Information Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, 745 F.2d 767, 772-73 (2d Cir.1984), that the
subway is not an open forum for public communication either
by tradition or designation. Despite government ownership,
it is the nature of the forum that we must examine in order
to determine the extent to which expressive activity may be
regulated. It long has been settled that all forms of speech
need not be permitted on property owned and controlled by a
governmental entity. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129, 101 S.Ct. 2676,
2685, 69 L.Ed.2d 517 (1981).
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In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992),
aff'g in part, 925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.1991), the Supreme Court
agreed with us that a regulation prohibiting solicitation of
funds in airline terminals operated by a public authority
did not violate the First Amendment. The plaintiff in that
case was a religious sect whose members solicited funds
in public places as part of a ritual. The Court “conclude[d]
that the terminals are nonpublic fora and that the regulation
reasonably limits solicitation.” Id. 505 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct.
at 2706. This conclusion followed the now-familiar “ ‘forum-
based’ approach for assessing restrictions that the government
seeks to place on the use of its property.” Id. 505 U.S. at ----,
112 S.Ct. at 2705. It also followed this significant observation
by the Court: “It is uncontested that the solicitation at issue
in this case is a form of speech protected under the First
Amendment.” Id.
[1]  The forum-based approach for First Amendment
analysis subjects to the highest scrutiny the regulation of
speech on government property traditionally available for
public expression. Id. Such property includes streets and
parks, which are said to “have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423
(1939).
In these quintessential public forums,
the government may not prohibit all
communicative activity. For the State
to enforce a content-based exclusion
it must show that its regulation
is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.... The
State may also enforce regulations
of the time, place, and manner of
expression which are content-neutral,
are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels
of communication.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (citation
omitted).
[2]  [3]  The category of public property opened for
expressive activity by part or all of the public is known
as the designated public forum, which may be of a limited
or unlimited character. Id. The same limitations as those
governing the traditional public forum apply to the regulation
of such property. Id. at 46, 103 S.Ct. at 955-56. The
regulation of expressive activity on public property neither
traditionally available nor designated for that purpose is
subject only to a limited review-the regulation must be
reasonable and not designed to prohibit the activity merely
because of disagreement with the views expressed. Id. The
airport terminals in International Society were classified as
nonpublic fora, and the regulation prohibiting solicitations
there was subject only to a reasonableness review, which it
passed. International Soc'y, 505 U.S. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct.
at 2706-08. According to a plurality of the Court, the same
was true for a postal service regulation prohibiting solicitation
on a sidewalk located on postal service property leading from
a parking lot to a post office. See United States v. Kokinda,
497 U.S. 720, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990).
In Kokinda, the Court noted that postal service property
was dedicated to *704  one means of communication only:
public notices were allowed to be posted on bulletin boards
designated for the purpose. Id. at 730, 110 S.Ct. at 3121-22.
[4]  The sidewalks of the City of New York fall into the
category of public property traditionally held open to the
public for expressive activity. See United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171, 179-80, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1708, 75 L.Ed.2d
736 (1983) (sidewalks comprising the outer boundaries of
the Supreme Court grounds are indistinguishable from other
sidewalks in Washington, D.C. and constitute a proper
public forum). Conduct of a communicative nature cannot
be regulated in “these quintessential public forums” in the
same manner as it can be regulated on the streets of a military
reservation. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 96 S.Ct. 1211,
47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976).
[5]  It cannot be gainsaid that begging implicates expressive
conduct or communicative activity. See Anthony J. Rose,
Note, The Beggar's Free Speech Claim, 65 Ind.L.J. 191,
200-02 (1989). As agreed by the parties in International
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Society, begging is at least “a form of speech.” 505 U.S. at ----,
112 S.Ct. at 2705. In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d
73 (1980), the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
prohibiting solicitation by charitable organizations that did
not use at least seventy-five percent of their revenues for
charitable purposes. The Court held that
charitable appeals for funds, on the
street or door to door, involve a variety
of speech interests-communication of
information, the dissemination and
propagation of views and ideas,
and the advocacy of causes-that
are within the protection of the
First Amendment.... [S]olicitation is
characteristically intertwined with
informative and perhaps persuasive
speech seeking support for particular
causes or for particular views
on ... social issues, and ...
without solicitation the flow of such
information and advocacy would
likely cease.
Id. at 632, 100 S.Ct. at 834; accord Riley v. National Fed.
of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101
L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (striking down North Carolina statute
regulating the fees that professional fundraiser may charge
a charity); Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson
Co., 467 U.S. 947, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984)
(striking down Maryland statute that prohibited charitable
organization, in connection with fund raising activity, from
paying professional fund raiser's expenses if those expenses
exceeded twenty-five percent of the amount raised).
Inherent in all the charitable solicitation cases revolving
around the First Amendment is the concept that “[c]anvassers
in such contexts are necessarily more than solicitors for
money.” Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632, 100 S.Ct.
at 834. While we indicated in Young that begging does not
always involve the transmission of a particularized social
or political message, see Young, 903 F.2d at 153, it seems
certain that it usually involves some communication of
that nature. Begging frequently is accompanied by speech
indicating the need for food, shelter, clothing, medical care or
transportation. Even without particularized speech, however,
the presence of an unkempt and disheveled person holding out
his or her hand or a cup to receive a donation itself conveys
a message of need for support and assistance. We see little
difference between those who solicit for organized charities
and those who solicit for themselves in regard to the message
conveyed. The former are communicating the needs of others
while the latter are communicating their personal needs. Both
solicit the charity of others. The distinction is not a significant
one for First Amendment purposes. See Blair v. Shanahan,
775 F.Supp. 1315, 1322 (N.D.Cal.1991) (appeal pending).
Having established that begging constitutes communicative
activity of some sort and that, as far as this case is concerned,
it is conducted in a traditional public forum, we next examine
whether the statute at issue: (1) is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve
that end; or (2) can be characterized as a regulation of the
time, place and manner of expression that is content neutral,
is narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests
and leaves open alternate channels *705  of communication.
Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 954-55.
[6]  [7]  First, it does not seem to us that any compelling state
interest is served by excluding those who beg in a peaceful
manner from communicating with their fellow citizens. Even
if the state were considered to have a compelling interest
in preventing the evils sometimes associated with begging,
a statute that totally prohibits begging in all public places
cannot be considered “narrowly tailored” to achieve that
end. Because of the total prohibition, it is questionable
whether the statute even can be said to “regulate” the time,
place and manner of expression but even if it does, it is
not content neutral because it prohibits all speech related
to begging; it certainly is not narrowly tailored to serve
any significant governmental interest, as previously noted,
because of the total prohibition it commands; it does not
leave open alternative channels of communication by which
beggars can convey their messages of indigency. In regard
to the “alternative channels” issue in Young, we observed
that the prohibition on panhandling in the subway did not
foreclose begging “throughout all of New York City.” Young,
903 F.2d at 160. Where, as here, a regulation is neither
content neutral nor narrowly tailored, it cannot be justified as
a proper time, place or manner restriction on protected speech,
regardless of whether or not alternate channels are available.
See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 1517, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (ban
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on distribution of commercial handbills on news racks held
violative of First Amendment).
[8]  Even if we were to apply the O'Brien analysis, as we
did in Young, we would find that the New York statute does
not pass First Amendment muster. According to O'Brien,
it is permissible to establish “incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms” in order to protect a “sufficiently
important governmental interest” that is “unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.” O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77,
88 S.Ct. at 1679. Here, the total prohibition on begging in
the city streets imposed by the statute cannot be characterized
as a merely incidental limitation, because it serves to silence
both speech and expressive conduct on the basis of the
message. See Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging
to Differ: The First Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104
Harv.L.Rev. 896, 909 (1991). Carrying out the O'Brien
analysis, the statute in no way advances substantial and
important governmental interests. If it did, the State would
not allow, as it does, the solicitation of contributions on city
streets by individuals who represent charitable organizations
that have registered with the Secretary of the State of New
York. See N.Y.Exec.Law § 172 (McKinney 1993). Moreover,
certain religious, educational and fraternal organizations
are entitled to solicit contributions in New York through
individual solicitors even without registration, due to a
statutory exemption. See id. § 172-a. If individuals may
solicit for charitable and other organizations, no significant
governmental interest is served by prohibiting others for
soliciting for themselves. Certainly, a member of a charitable,
religious or other organization who seeks alms for the
organization and is also, as a member, a beneficiary of those
alms should be treated no differently from one who begs for
his or her own account. See Charles Feeney Knapp, Note,
Statutory Restriction of Panhandling in Light of Young v.
New York City Transit: Are States Begging Out of First
Amendment Proscriptions?, 76 Iowa L.Rev. 405, 416 (1991).
[9]  Assuming that the statute at issue were to be classified
as an incidental restriction on free expression, O'Brien
requires that the restriction be “no greater than is essential
to the furtherance” of the government's interest. O'Brien,
391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679. According to the City
Police, the interest of the government lies in preventing
the fraud, intimidation, coercion, harassment and assaultive
conduct that is said frequently to accompany begging by
individual street solicitors who do not solicit on behalf
of any organization. But, as has been demonstrated, there
are a number of statutes that address this sort of conduct
specifically. The statute that prohibits loitering for the
purpose of begging must be considered as providing a
restriction greater than is essential *706  to further the
government interests listed by the City Police, for it sweeps
within its overbroad purview the expressive conduct and
speech that the government should have no interest in stifling.
See C.C.B. v. Florida, 458 So.2d 47 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984).
A verbal request for money for sustenance or a gesture
conveying that request carries no harms of the type
enumerated by the City Police, if done in a peaceful manner.
However, both the organizational solicitor and the individual
solicitor are prosecutable for conduct that oversteps the
bounds of peaceful begging.
In City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wash.2d 635, 802 P.2d 1333
(1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 1690,
114 L.Ed.2d 85 (1991), the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington rejected a constitutional challenge to a Seattle
ordinance that prohibited people from obstructing pedestrian
or vehicular traffic or aggressively begging. See Seattle,
Wash.Mun.Code § 12A.12.015(B) (1987). “Aggressively
beg” was defined in the ordinance as meaning “to beg with
[the] intent to intimidate another person into giving money
or goods.” Id. § 12A.12.015(A)(1). “Obstruct pedestrian or
vehicular traffic” meant “to walk, stand, sit, lie, or place
an object in such a manner as to block passage by another
person or a vehicle, or to require another person or a driver
of a vehicle to take evasive action to avoid physical contact.”
Id. § 12A.12.015(A)(3). Constitutionally protected picketing
and protesting explicitly were exempted from punishment.
Id. In upholding the statute, the Webster court emphasized
that the specific intent element of the statute saved it from
being overbroad, vague or unreasonable. Webster, 802 P.2d
at 1338-40. Although the majority of the court in that case
focused its analysis on the “pedestrian interference” language
of the statute because the defendant in the case had not been
charged with aggressive begging, Justice Utter found that
begging was protected speech that could be regulated with
narrowly drawn time, place and manner restrictions. Id. at
1342-44 (Utter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
We refer to Webster only because it deals with a regulation
that prohibits conduct that extends beyond speech, expression
and communication. In contrast with the Seattle ordinance,
the statute before us prohibits verbal speech as well as
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communicative conduct, not in the confined precincts of
the subway system, see Young, supra, or in the crowded
environment of a state fair, see Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651, 101
S.Ct. 2559, 2565-66, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981), but in the open
forum of the streets of the City of New York. The New York
statute does not square with the requirements of the First
Amendment. The plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are
entitled to the relief they seek. See Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n. 5, 104 S.Ct.
3065, 3069 n. 5, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984).
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
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